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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BANK OF EPHRAIM, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HALBERT DAVIS, STEVIE KAY 
STEINMANN, BABYLON CORPORATION, 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS, FIRST 
STATE BANK, UTAH STATE TAX COMMIS-
SION, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 14514 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT, 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Bank of Ephraira brought a foreclosure action 
against Halbert Davis based on defaults upon notes secured 
by mortgages upon two parcels of real property located in 
Sanpete County, State of Utah, and against the other defen-
dants, each having an interest of record upon the real pro-
perty. The defendants, other than Halbert Davis, made 
counterclaims and crossclaims based upon notes secured by 
instruments of record or liens of record. Judgment was 
awarded by the Sixth Judicial District Court to the Bank of 
Ephraim, Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association, and the Utah State Tax Commission. The 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure specified the amounts to 
be paid the judgment creditors from the proceeds of the 
foreclosure sale and the priority of payment. 
- 2 -
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent and cross-appellant Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association prays that the judgment be affirmed 
as to the priorities on parcels 1 and 2, hereafter the "cafe 
property/1 that the Court reverse the trial court's findings 
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment insofar as the Bank 
of Ephraira was awarded priority over Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association in excess of $4,000 on parcel 3, 
hereafter the "trailer court property," and reverse as to 
the award of attorneyfs fees of Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association, directing the trial court to award attor-
ney's fees consistent with the evidence and with the other 
findings and conclusions of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association 
(hereafter "Prudential"), agrees with the Statement of Facts 
insofar as set forth in the appellant's brief. However, 
there are additional facts, primarily dealing with the re-
cording order of the various mortgages, which are not stated 
in appellant's brief, but are set forth below. In addition, 
this Statement of Facts includes a summary of the facts upon 
which Prudential relies for its claim of attorney's fees. 
The records of the Sanpete County Recorder reflect 
the following mortgages as to the cafe property in order of 
recordation: 
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(1) Halbert Davis to Bank of Ephraim, dated 
August 7, 1970, recorded August 10, 1970, at Book 150, 
page 413. On the face of the mortgage, typed on the 
printed standard form, appears the following language: 
"This mortgage covers all additional advances on this 
loan, the total principal amount not to exceed $3,000." 
(2) Halbert Davis to Steven Kay Steinmann, dated 
August 7, 1970, recorded August 10, 1970, at Book 150, 
page 419, assigned to Babylon Corporation on January 28, 
1972, recorded January 28, 1972, at Book 163, page 194. 
The mortgage secured indebtedness in the amount of 
$14,500. 
(3) Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association, dated June 1, 1972, recorded 
June 22, 1972, at Book 165, page 750. This installment 
note and mortgage was to secure the amount of $4,073.40. 
(4) Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association, dated October 16, 1972, re-
corded October 19, 1972, at Book 167, page 381. This 
installment note and mortgage secured indebtedness in 
the sum of $10,228.80, which included the prior in-
stallment note and mortgage of $4,073.40 (R. 125-8). 
The records of the Sanpete County Recorder reflect 
the following mortgages as to the trailer court property, in 
order of recordation: 
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(1) Halbert Davis to Bank of Ephraim, dated 
March 15, 1971, recorded March 18, 1971, at Book 155, 
page 534. The mortgage stated that it secured indebted-
ness in the amount of $4,000 and contained a provision 
typed on the face of the Bank's standard form as follows: 
"This mortgage covers all additional advances on this 
loan, the total principal amount not to exceed $6,000." 
(2) Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association, dated June 21, 1972, recorded 
June 22, 1972, at Book 165, page 750. This installment 
note and mortgage secured indebtedness in the sum of 
$4,073.40. 
(3) Halbert D. Davis to Prudential Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Association, dated October 16, 1972, re-
corded October 19, 1972, at Book 167, page 381. This 
installment note and mortgage secured indebtedness in 
the sum of $10,228.80, which included the prior in-
stallment note and mortgage of $4,073.40 (R. 125-8). 
In addition to the foregoing, Halbert D. Davis 
executed mortgages securing indebtedness to First State Bank 
and several judgments appear of record, all subsequent to 
the date of the mortgages listed above and not in issue at 
trial or on appeal. 
The Court awarded judgment and assigned the pri-
orities on the cafe and trailer court properties as set 
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forth in the brief of the appellant. The attorneys for 
Babylon Corporation, Prudential, Halbert Davis and the Bank 
of Ephraim testified as to attorney's fees. S. Rex Lewis, 
attorney for Steven Steinmann and Babylon Corporation, upon 
cross examination by Udell Jensen, attorney for Halbert 
Davis, testified as follows: 
Q How many hours did you say you haa spent? 
A Twenty, up until today's date. 
Q And is it your usual charge at the office about 
thirty-five dollars per hour? 
A Fifty dollars. 
Q And so the balance for that request: is based upon 
the anticipation of service today and subsequent? 
A Additional time will be spent. 
Q And your figure for today if you charge today by 
that same rate or by so much per day? 
A Yes. 
Q You charge two hundred dollars a day, is that what 
your Court charge is? 
A We charge three hundred fifty dollars a day or 
more. It's usually more if we have to go out of 
town. 
Q If you calculate it on the usual figures, you 
would have approximately twenty-three hundred 
dollars? 
A A strictly hourly basis, I will have, approxi-
mately 2,000. 
(Tr., pp. 29-31.) 
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Wayne G. Petty, attorney for Prudential, testi-
fied as follows: 
A As to attorney's fees, the total time spent to 
date on this matter is thirty-seven and a half 
hours, certain costs have also been incurred in 
this matter, twenty-five dollars title search, 
travel expenses, copies of pleadings and so forth, 
totaling a hundred and sixty-seven dollars. 
THE COURT: Does that include the title 
search, Mr. Petty? 
MR. PETTY: Yes it does, your Honor. I have 
estimated that the time involved in appearance 
today would be eight hours, and estimating time to 
draw findings of fact and conclusions and an 
appearance at the foreclosure sale, if necessary, 
would be an additional eight hours, which would be 
a total of fifty-three and a half hours, that the 
normal billing rate for those hours is forty 
dollars per hour, and that is a reasonable fee for 
those services, and that the attorney's fee would 
be awarded to Prudential should be based on that 
hourly figure of forty dollars per hour, which 
is a total of two thousand one hundred forty 
dollars. 
(Tr. pp. 34-5.) 
Udell R. Jensen, attorney for Halbert Davis, 
testified as to attorney's fees as follows: 
That it has been my observation and experience in 
mortgage foreclosure while there is security that 
the amount of the attorney's fees bears a rela-
tionship to the amount of the obligation; that the 
obligation amount is graduated from a larger 
amount, of above twenty-five thousand dollars, 
generally, at ten percent or less, when you get to 
the lower amounts like five thousand dollars, that 
is involved in this particular case, like five to 
six, that the general rate of taxing that is 
nearer twenty percent. . . . So far as the matter 
of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan, I would 
think their fee would be nearer eleven hundred and 
twelve hundred would be a reasonable fee to obli-
gate debtor to pay. (Tr. p. 71.) 
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Upon cross examination by counsel for Prudential, 
Mr. Jensen testified as follows: 
Q Is an hourly attorney's fee a reasonable basis for 
charging fees? 
A Consultation for him and his client, I think it 
is. 
Q Nowf isn't is true, Mr. Jensen, that the fore-
closure proceedings that are involved in this 
matter as to Babylon Corporation and Bank of 
Ephraim and as to Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association are substantially the same? 
A You mean the amount of work and effort? 
Q Well I mean that partly and I mean just the nature 
of the foreclosure proceeding itself as set forth 
by Utah statute and by Utah law; aren't they 
substantially 
A They become substantially the same whenever the 
defendant commences a cross complaint and becomes 
substantially the plaintiff as to his own client. 
(Tr., p. 75.) 
Counsel for Halbert Davis also testified that fees 
based upon the amount of obligations were based upon: 
[S]ome publications [that] have come across my 
desk in years gone by referred to credation of 
secured obligations and unsecured obligations with 
respect to percentages that were commonly attri-
buted to payment and the obligation upon the 
debtors who had them. (Tr. p. 72.) 
Upon cross examination by counsel for Prudential, Mr. Jensen 
testified as follows: 
Q What's the source of these publications that you 
refer to? 
A Well, I first became experienced in that in con-
nection with the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley and 
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that's some 25 or 30 years ago, and then became 
experienced in connection with those handling 
private lenders at Nephi, Utah, and subsequent 
to that there would be an occasional mortgage 
or liens to be foreclosed and then in connection 
with those matters beginning about six years ago, 
I represented the Bank of Ephraim for about three 
years in connection with this foreclosure. 
Q Who published these publications that you refer 
to? 
A I can't give you the item. It's too long ago that 
I saw and I can't give that. 
Q So is your testimony based on these publications, 
the source of which you can't recall? 
A No, partially upon that and partially upon my 
practice and partially on what I have observed 
others have done. 
Q Are any of these schedules that you have referred 
to based upon a bar schedule? 
A I have seen them at the time until I recently had 
some problems as to whether or not they would be 
schedule accepted. I don't remember what the Utah 
Bar is and I haven't looked at it in the — 
Q You say a question of whether or not the schedules 
would be acceptable? 
A The courts, as I understand, have been saying that 
we may not have a fixed schedule as members of our 
Bar, that we have to have some other standard be-
cause of the matter tending to be antitrust or 
some other basis. 
(Tr., pp. 72-3; emphasis added.) 
Louis Tervort, counsel for the Bank of Ephraim, 
upon cross examination by counsel for Prudential, testified 
as follows: 
Q Now, if Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion were to pay for the amount of attorney's fees 
on the basis of $40 per hour for the time their 
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attorney spent on this case, and further assuming 
that that amount of time was somewhere in the 
vicinity of 40 hours, would that be a reasonable 
fee in your judgment. 
A I don't think that I would take it as a reasonable 
fee in this case, no, 
Q Would that be too much? 
A I am not saying in all cases, but I would say it 
would not be. 
Mr. Tervort also testified that all costs were included in 
the fees claimed on behalf of the Bank of Ephraim (Tr. p. 91). 
The trial court awarded the Bank of Ephraim attor-
ney's fees in the amount of $4,650, Prudential attorney's 
fees in the amount of $900 and costs of $25, and Babylon 
Corporation attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000 and 
costs of $40 (R. 248-53). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF PRIORITIES AS TO 
THE CAFE PROPERTY IS CORRECT AND PROPER 
The priority of the Bank of Ephraim over Pruden-
tial Federal Savings & Loan Association is limited to the 
amount of $3,000, based upon the provision on the face of 
the mortgage as follows: "This mortgage covers all addi-
tional advances on this loan, the total principal amount not 
to exceed $3,000." By the recording of the mortgage, se-
curing indebtedness in the amount of $2,400, and based on 
the language quoted above, a subsequent lender is on notice 
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of the amount of indebtedness and the limitation upon se-
cured indebtedness of $3,000, including the initial indebted-
ness and subsequent advances. Section 57-3-2, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, provides as follows: 
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing 
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged 
or approved, and certified, in the manner pre-
scribed by this title . . . or a copy thereof, 
required by law to be recorded in the office 
of the county recorder shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder for record, 
impart notice to all persons of the contents 
thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees 
and lienholders shall be deemed to purchase 
and take with notice. (Emphasis added.) 
In Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 
523 P.2d 1226 (Utah, 1974), this Court referred to Section 
57-3-2, U.C.A. 1953. The Court held that where there was an 
overlap in descriptions of property sold to the plaintiff 
and defendant by their common seller: 
[P]laintiffs having recorded their notice 
of purchase prior to the recording of the 
defendant's deed, the defendant becomes 
the subsequent purchaser and is deemed to 
take with notice of the plaintiff's interest. 
(Footnote omitted; emphasis added.) 
(Inasmuch as the issues involved in this matter relate 
entirely to mortgagees, with no issue as to whether the 
mortgagees are subject to and entitled to rely upon the 
provisions of Section 57-3-2, U.C.A. 1953, the objection of 
the dissent in the Wilson case is not presented.) 
It is undisputed that the Bank of Ephraim's mort-
gage was recorded prior to any interest of the other claimants 
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in this case. However, the subsequent mortgagees, by virtue 
of the Bank of Ephraim having recorded its mortgage, had 
notice of the contents of the Bank of Ephraim1s mortgage, 
and the limitation upon secured indebtedness contained 
therein. The contents of the mortgage indicate that the 
mortgage was to secure indebtedness in the amount of $2,400, 
with a possible additional advance to an amount of $3,000. 
Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lienholders could rely 
upon the contents of the mortgage in transactions concerning 
the property. 
The Bank of Ephraim is limited as to subsequent 
mortgagees to the limitations provided in its own documents. 
The mortgage in favor of the Bank of Ephraim is on the 
Bank's printed form, with the limitation language added by 
typewriter. If there is any uncertainty as to the meaning 
of the provisions of a contract, it is construed against its 
framer. Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 U.2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 
(1965); General Mills, Inc. v. Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 
P.2d 1089 (1943). 
This rule, that the limitation contained on the 
face of the mortgage gives notice to subsequent lienholders 
and is binding on the mortgagee is stated in a case cited by 
the Bank of Ephraim in its Brief on Appeal. In Tapia v. 
DeMartini, 19 Pac. 641 (Cal. 1888) , a mortgage on real 
property secured indebtedness, and by the terms of the 
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mortgage the indebtedness could include future advances up 
to $15,000. The Court held the mortgage valid and prior to 
subsequent encumbrances recorded before future advances were 
made, such priority up to the amount expressly limited by 
the mortgage. The Supreme Court of California stated the 
following: 
[T]he mortgage under which the appellant 
claims was of record, and was notice to 
subsequent encumbrancers that it consti-
tuted a lien on the property to the full 
sum of $15,000.. They [the materialmen] 
performed labor on the property, with 
full notice of the existence of a lien 
to that amount. (19 Pac. 643; emphasis 
added.) 
In claiming priority over the mortgage of Halbert 
Davis to Steven Kay Steinmann, the Bank of Ephraim states 
that the mortgage to Steinmann expressly states that the 
mortgage is secondary to the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim. 
The Bank of Ephraim relies upon the language in the mortgage 
to Steven Kay Steinmann, but wants to repudiate the language 
in its own mortgage. References in mortgages that such 
mortgage is subject to a prior mortgage or that it is a 
second mortgage have been construed consistently with such 
provisions, making the mortgage subject to the prior encum-
brance. In Summers v. Hallam Cooley Enterprises, 132 P.2d 
60 (Cal.App. 1942), the Court held that the words "second 
mortgage" in a document made the mortgage subordinate to a 
prior mortgage, in spite of the second mortgagee's claim 
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that her interest should be prior. See also Anderson v. 
Barr, 62 P.2d 1242 (Okla. 1937); Richards v. Lawing, 27 P.2d 
730 (Wash. 1934). The provision of the mortgage of the Bank 
of Ephraim, limiting the advances on the loan to $3f000, 
should be given effect, which would be consistent with the 
rule of the foregoing cases giving meaning to the language 
of the recorded documents, which give notice to subsequent 
lienholders and encumbrancers. 
Rules of construction of documents establish that 
the Bank of Ephraim's claims on appeal are without merit. 
The first rule of construction applicable here is that the 
language of the document must be given its plain and ordi-
nary meaning. j 
In Bonneville Lumber Co. v. J. G. Peppard Seed Co., 
72 Utah 463, 271 Pac. 226 (1928), the plaintiff sued for 
conversion of crops mortgaged by the defendant to secure a 
promissory note. In construing the mortgage, the Court 
stated the following: 
It is a cardinal rule of construction, and 
the first to be applied whenever construction 
becomes necessary, that, unless technical 
terms are used, the language must be given 
its plain, ordinary and obvious meaning. 
[State v. Davis, 55 Utah 54, 184 P. 161.] 
If that rule is applied to the instant 
case, it is unnecessary to make further 
comment as to the meaning of the language 
in question here. 
The plain meaning of the inserted language is that 
advances in excess of $3,000 are not secured. The Bank of 
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Ephraim contends that the provisions that the mortgage is to 
secure all future advances must also be given effect. 
However, another rule of construction of documents requires 
that "where there is a printed form of a contract, and other 
words are inserted, in writing or otherwise, it is to be 
assumed that they take precedence over the printed matter." 
Holland v. Brown, 15 U.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964). Thus, 
the inserted limitations on indebtedness to $3,000 take 
precedence over the printed form language to resolve any 
inconsistency. 
The Bank of Ephraim has failed to cite any author-
ity which deals with the specific question of the effect of 
the $3,000 limitation in the mortgage upon subsequent mort-
gagees. In fact, it does not even address this basic prob-
lem. The only authorities cited by the Bank of Ephraim 
bearing even remotely on the issue are several cases in 
support of the rule that "advances made under a recorded 
mortgage given to secure further optional advances will not 
be denied priority in lien merely because the intervening 
encumbrancer could not have determined from the mortgage, 
without extraneous inquiry, the true amount of the indebted-
ness of advances secured thereby." In the present case, no 
extraneous inquiry is necessary to determine the advances 
made by the Bank of Ephraim to be secured by the mortgage, 
because an express limitation appears on the face of the 
mortgage itself. 
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Whether the advances to be secured by the mortgage 
on the cafe property were optional or whether the Bank of 
Ephraim had actual notice of subsequent mortgages is irrele-
vant in view of the express limitation contained in the 
mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim. (However, whether the 
advances were optional is relevant to the priorities on the 
trailer court property. See Point II of this Brief.) 
The claim of the Bank of Ephraim must be denied in 
view of General Mills, Inc. v. Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 
P.2d 1089 (1943), which is so similar to the instant case as 
to be controlling. In General Mills, the first paragraph of 
the mortgage contained language that the mortgage is given 
"as security for the performance of all obligations of the 
mortgagors herein contained or expressed." The fourth 
paragraph stated, in part, that the mortgagors would pay 
"all other sums now or hereafter due or owing from the 
Mortgagors to the Mortgagee; provided, however, that the 
maximum amount, the payment of which is secured hereby, is 
$3,750.00." (Emphasis added.) After stating rules of 
construction, including the rule that an ambiguity in a 
document is construed against the drawer, particularly a 
I 
lender of money, the Court stated its holding: 
We are constrained to hold from a con-
sideration of the contract in its entirety, 
the contract res and the relation of the 
parties to each other, that the parties 
intended by their agreement to enter into 
a chattel mortgage to secure the sum of 
not to exceed $3,750 by a lien . . . . 
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This case requires that this Court deny the claims that the 
Bank of Ephraim has priority on the cafe property over 
subsequent mortgagees in excess of the specific limitation 
of $3,000. 
Similarly, in Western Mortgage L. Corp. v, Cotton-
wood Const. Co., 18 U.2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967), the 
mortgage provided that it was to secure additional loans 
made after the date thereof to the owner of the real estate, 
provided that no additional advancement would be made if it 
caused the total indebtedness secured by the mortgage to 
exceed the amount of the original indebtedness. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the amount of the mortgage, includ-
ing advances in an amount less than the original indebted-
ness and which were made subsequent to improvements made on 
the property, took priority over mechanic's liens filed 
against the property resulting from the improvements. In 
applying the Western Mortgage case to the instant case, 
where the mortgage of the Bank of Ephraim on its face cre-
ated a limitation as to the amount which could be advanced, 
the subsequent mortgage of Prudential takes priority over 
any advance in excess of the amount specified in the mort-
gage to the Bank of Ephraim. 
In summary, the provisions of the mortgage to the 
Bank of Ephraim must be given effect, and subsequent mort-
gagees are entitled to rely upon the provisions thereof in 
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making subsequent loans secured by the property. The pri-
ority of the Bank of Ephraim is limited by the express 
limitation contained in its own mortgage. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED INSOFAR AS THE 
BANK OF EPHRAIM WAS AWARDED PRIORITY OVER PRUDENTIAL 
IN EXCESS OF $4,000 ON THE TRAILER COURT PROPERTY 
BECAUSE THE EXCESS WAS NOT MANDATORY AND WAS 
ADVANCED AFTER PRUDENTIALfS LOAN AND MORTGAGE 
On March 15, 1971, the Bank of Ephraim loaned 
Halbert T. Davis $4,000, secured by a mortgage in favor of 
the Bank of Ephraim on the trailer court property. There-
after, on June 21, 1972, Prudential made its loan to defen-
dant Davis, which loan was secured by a mortgage on the cafe 
and trailer court properties. This loan was superceded by a 
subsequent loan by Prudential to Davis on October 16, 1972. 
Finally, on July 31, 1974, the Bank of Ephraim loaned Davis 
$1,508.41. The additional loan of the Bank of Ephraim to 
Davis was not mandatory and was advanced two years after its 
original loan and Prudential's loan secured by the trailer 
court property. 
The predominant rule on the issue of priority 
where advances are made is that if such advances are op-
tional and not mandatory, then the lien priority for the 
advances is determined as of the time the advances are 
actually made. In the present case, the Bank of Ephraim 
made a loan of $4,000, followed by Prudential's loan and 
then followed by optional advances by the Bank of Ephraim 
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two years after Prudential's loan. The optional advances of 
the Bank of Ephraim are subordinate to Prudential's loan and 
mortgage. 
In National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors, 
506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973), a materialman, Columbia Wood 
Products, Inc., claimed that the construction loan advances 
of National Bank of Washington and General Mortgage Invest-
ment were optional and, thus, subordinate to the advances 
made by Columbia Wood Products. The Supreme Court of Wash-
ington stated the rule as follows: 
If [the advances] were optional, then under 
the principles adopted by this Court, Columbia 
Wood Products' lien for lumber delivered and 
utilized in the apartment house project should 
be superior to that of the bank's deed of trust 
insofar as advances made subsequent to the 
materialman's perfected lien are concerned. 
If the bank, however, under the construction 
loan agreement, could have been compelled in 
the course to advance the monies on the 
loan, then its lien is totally superior 
and prior to that of Columbia Wood Products. 
506 P.2d at 27, 28. 
In finding that the advances of the lenders were optional, 
the Court cited numerous authorities in support of the rules 
stated above: 
Thus, we are adhering to what we perceive 
to be the weight of authority in the rule 
that, where the advances of promised loan 
monies are, under an agreement to lend the 
money, largely optional, that is, where the 
time and the amount of the monies to be 
advanced are largely discretionary in the 
lender, the legal effect of such provisions 
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is to bring the transaction under the rule 
for optional advances rather than the rule 
governing mandatory advances for the purpose 
of determining lien priorities• Optional 
advances under a construction loan agreement, 
attach when the advances are actually made. 
Any liens attaching prior to an optional 
advance would thus be superior to it, and 
attaching afterwards, junior to it. Elmen-
dorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn, 10 Wash.2d 29, 116 
P.2d 253 (1941); Kimmel v. Batty, 168 Colo. 
431, 451 P.2d 751 (1969); Peterson v. John J. 
Reilly, Inc., 105 N.H. 340, 200 A.2d 21 (1964); 
Lyman Land Co. v. Union Bank of Benton, 237 
Ark. 629, 374 S.W.2d 820 (1964). 
In Kimmel v. Batty, 451 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1969), the 
Supreme Court of Colorado stated the following: 
It is universally held that where a mortgagee 
is obligated to make advances, he will be 
protected in his security for the full amount 
of such advances whether made before or after 
an intervening lien attaches, and in most 
jurisdictions it is immaterial whether he 
had notice of the intervening lien prior 
to making such advancement . . . . First 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, of Rochester 
v. Green Acres Bldg. Corp., 38 Misc.2d 149, 
236 N.Y.S.2d 1009. In the case last cited, 
it was held that under a mortgage to secure 
future advances, ' . . .if it is optional with 
the mortgagee to make or refuse the advances, 
he will be protected by security of his mort-
gage only as to the advances made before the 
attaching of the junior lien or encumbrance.' 
We approve this rule. (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in Leche v. Ponca City Production Credit 
Assn., 478 P.2d 347 (Okla. 1970), the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma held that where a prior mortgagee was not obligated 
for future advances under the real estate mortgage and had 
actual knowledge of an obligation on the subsequent mort-
gage, the prior mortgagee could not extend the mortgage to 
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encompass debts not included originally and could not claim 
priority of its mortgage to secure advances made after the 
subsequent mortgage. 
The Bank of Ephraim, in its Brief on Appeal, 
states at page 9: "The plaintiff admits at the beginning 
that the advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional 
and not obligatory under the mortgage." Therefore, the 
priority of the Bank of Ephraim as to the trailer park 
property over Prudential is limited to the $4,000 advanced 
prior to Prudential's installment note and mortgage. The 
advance which the Bank of Ephraim claims is prior to Pru-
dential's installment note and mortgage was made more than 
two years after Prudential's loan secured by the mortgage on 
the trailer court property. 
The Utah case of Utah Savings & Loan Association 
v. Mecham, 11 U.2d 159, 356 P.2d 281 (1960), aff'd on re-
hearing, 12 U.2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961), supports the 
foregoing rule and authorities. In the Mecham case, the 
issue was the priority of the mortgagee in relation to 
materialmen whose liens attached after the mortgage, but 
prior to certain advances made by the mortgagee. Because 
the findings of the trial court were inadequate for deter-
mination of the issues presented, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the trial court for further proceedings. In 
doing so, the Court said: "Because of the necessity for 
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further proceedings we hereinafter discuss certain princi-
ples of law applicable thereto." Among the principles 
discussed is the priority issue based on required advances: 
The remaining defendant lien claimants 
also argue that they shold be permitted to 
retain the priorities awarded them by the 
trial court because there was no legally 
binding agreement between the Mechams as 
mortgagors and the plaintiff as mortgagee 
covering the future advances to be made 
on the obligations and, therefore, the money 
advanced after those lien claimants had com-
menced delivering the materials to the pro-
perties should be treated as separate trans-
actions, inferior to their lien rights. It 
is therefore necessary for the trial court 
to determine when the mortgagee became bound 
to advance such moneys. . . . It must be 
appreciated that a mortgagee who is loaning 
money to a mortgagor-borrower generally is 
not only entitled but obligated to pay out 
the money in accordance with the directions 
of the borrower. 356 P.2d at 284. (Emphasis 
added.) 
That future advances were optional is admitted by the Bank 
of Ephraim. Thus, the priority which arises where the 
advances are obligatory, Mecham, supra, does not occur in 
the case at bar. Therefore, under the rules and authority 
cited above, the priority of the Bank of Ephraim is governed 
by the order of its advances in relation to loans of other 
mortgagees. 
The priority of the Bank of Ephraim on the trailer 
court property is limited to $4,000, the amount of its loan 
prior to the loan and mortgage of Prudential. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF ITS AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS TO PRUDENTIAL 
The trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment in awarding Prudential attorney's fees in 
the amount of $900 and costs in the amount of $25 are incon-
sistent with other Findings and Conclusions of the Court and 
inconsistent with the evidence introduced. 
The uncontradicted testimony from each of the 
attorneys involved at the trial was that a fee based upon 
the time spent by the attorney, if charged at a reasonable 
rate, was appropriate. Udell Jensen, attorney for defendant 
Davis, when asked if an hourly attorney's fee is a reason-
able basis for charging fees, stated "consultation for him 
and his client, I think it is." The testimony of Louis 
Tervort, counsel for the Bank of Ephraim, and S. Rex Lewis, 
counsel for Steven Kay Steinmann and Babylon Corporation, 
support an award of attorney's fees based upon the time 
spent on the case. Counsel for Prudential testified that 
the time spent to the date of trial was 37-1/2 hours, esti-
mated the appearance at the trial to be eight hours, and a 
possible appearance at the foreclosure sale would be an 
additional eight hours, for a total of 53-1/2 hours, and 
that the normal billing rate for the time is $40 per hour. 
Prudential's counsel also testifed as to costs in the amount 
of $167.00. 
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Although the attorney for Halbert Davis stated 
that a fee based upon an hourly basis is not unreasonable, 
his testimony was that if the attorney's fees were based on 
the amount involved in the obligation, a fee based on $5,000 
indebtedness would be nearly $1,100 and $1,200. 
In spite of the foregoing evidence, the trial 
court awarded $900 as Prudential's attorney fees and $25 
costs. The installment note and mortgage of Prudential 
(Exhibit 6) obligates the defendant Davis to pay a "reason-
able attorney fee in addition to other costs and expenses" 
upon foreclosure. The narrow question here is what consti-
tutes a reasonable fee and whether the claim of Prudential 
exceeded a reasonable fee. 
In FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 
U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), the Supreme Court reversed the 
i 
trial court's award of attorney's fees because there was no 
evidence on which to base the award. The Court stated: 
It is fundamental that the judgment must be 
based upon findings of fact, which in turn 
must be based upon the evidence. This rule 
has been followed by this Court and other 
jurisdictions in regard to awarding attorney's 
fees. Because both judges and lawyers have 
special knowledge as to the value of legal 
services, this is not always required to be 
proved by sworn testimony. It is sometimes 
submitted upon stipulation: as to the amount; 
or that the judge may fix it on the basis of 
his own knowledge and experience; and/or in 
connection with reference to a Bar approved 
schedule. Any one of these would have pro-
vided an evidenciarv basis for makina the 
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determination. However, it was an issue 
of fact which was denied. Thus it was a 
part of plaintiff's case to which it had 
the burden of proving. Failing to offer 
proof of any character on this issue had 
the same effect as would the failure to offer 
proof as to any other controverted issue. 
There is nothing upon which to base a finding. 
404 P.2d 673-74. 
FMA Financial indicates that attorney's fees may, 
but need not, be submitted (1) upon stipulation as to the 
amount, (2) upon the parties' stipulation that the judge may 
fix a fee based on his knowledge and experience, or (3) with 
reference to a Bar-approved schedule. The attorney's fees 
in the instant case were not submitted on any of the fore-
going bases, but rather were proved by sworn testimony. 
Although the trial court is in an advantaged 
position to judge the amount of reasonable attorney's fees, 
Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 U.2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965), 
the finding of the Court must nonetheless be based upon the 
evidence. FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra. 
The rule of this Court is that attorney's fees are left to 
agreement between the attorney and his client, "subject to 
the right of the Court to discipline the attorney where the 
fee charged is unconscionable, or advantage is taken of the 
ignorance of the client." Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 
207 P.2d 178 (1949). In Rudd v. Crown International, 26 
U.2d 263, 488 P.2d 298 (1971), the Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court's award of $10,000 in attorney's fees. 
- 25 -
Plaintiff's counsel originally agreed to work for $35 per 
hour, but as the action progressed and motions and hearings 
multiplied, the fee was raised to $5,000, then to $10,000. 
This Court affirmed the award of $10,000, the amount agreed 
upon by the attorney and his client, as testified to at the 
trial. 
In John C. Cutler Association v. De Jay Stores, 3 
U.2d 107, 279 P.2d 700 (1955), the plaintiff appealed an 
award of $300 attorney's fees. No evidence was introduced 
at the trial concerning the fees, but the parties stipulated 
that the trial court could determine the amount to be awarded. 
The Court stated: 
Under such circumstances, it is permissible 
for the trial court, who as a lawyer and 
judge has special knowledge and experience 
concerning such matters, to take into con-
sideration his own knowledge and to use his 
judgment as to the value of such services. 
But there being no evidence for us to review, 
it is more difficult to appraise the reasonable-
ness of the judgment than if there had been 
evidence for comparison with it. 279 P.2d 
at 704. 
At the trial of the present case, the issue of 
attorney's fees was not submitted upon stipulation for 
determination by the Court, but was rather based on sworn 
testimony at the trial. 
The award of attorney's fees to counsel for Pru-
dential is inconsistent with the award of attorney's fees to 
counsel for Steven Kay Steinmann and Babylon Corporation. 
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Steinmann and Babylon Corporation were awarded attorney's 
fees in the amount of $2,000, whereas Prudential was awarded 
$900. It is clear that the award to Babylon of $2,000 was 
based on an hourly basis since counsel for Steinmann and 
Babylon testified-f "A strictly hourly basis, I will have, 
approximately $2,000." His testimony was that $50 per hour 
was his usual hourly rate. The testimony of counsel for 
Prudential indicated 45-1/2 hours, through the trial, not 
including subsequent time f03r drawing findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and appearing at a foreclosure sale. 
Counsel for Prudential testified that $40 per hour is a 
normal and reasonable fee for the services provided, which 
would result in a fee of $1,820. Findings of fact neces-
sarily contrary to each other should not be permitted to 
stand. Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 4 U.2d 181, 290 
P.2d 689 (1955). See West v. West, 16 U.2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 
(1965). 
The evidence submitted to the Court by each of the 
attorneys, supports the claim of Prudential of a fee based 
upon the time spent on the matter. This Court should 
reverse the trial court's award and direct entry of an award 
based upon the evidence introduced at trial. The attorney's 
fee should be at least $1,820, and costs in the amount of 
$167.00. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's determination of the priorities 
as to the cafe property is supported by the evidence intro-
duced at trial, is in accordance with law, and should be 
affirmed. The limitation of $3,000 on the face of the 
mortgage must be given effect and act as notice to subse-
quent mortgagees. 
The priority of the Bank of Ephraim over Pruden-
tial Federal Savings & Loan Association on the trailer court 
property must be limited to $4,000. The Bank's subsequent 
advance, made after Prudential's loan and mortgage, was 
purely optional and thus subordinate to Prudential's loan. 
The trial court's award of attorney's fees and 
costs to Prudential was contrary to the evidence and should 
be reversed with instructions to enter an award of at least 
$1,820, with costs of $167.00. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of August, 
1976. 
MOYLE & DRAPER) 
By 
Wayne G. Petty 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association 
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